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“Right to Work” Legislation: A Meaningless Choice that Constricts Union Operations

I.

Introduction
A current trend among the states is the adoption of “right to work” laws.1 Today, twenty-

eight states adopted right to work laws, with other states likely to follow suit.2 These laws,
although varying in minor aspects, all stipulate that the prospective employment of an individual
cannot be conditioned on their approval of joining a union.3 Right to Work laws further mandate
that employers can no longer condition employment on the acceptance of union membership.4
Proponents of right to work laws find their statutory support in NLRA Sections 8(a)(3)
and 14(b).5 The foundation of right to work laws is found in Section 8(a)(3), which states that “it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer… by discrimination in regard to hire… to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.”6 This statutory language echoes
the purpose of right to work laws, which is to give prospective employees a choice regarding
their union membership. Furthermore, the NLRA states in Section 14(b) that “nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.”7 The statutory language is
clear in conveying a choice regarding union membership to prospective laborers. States are
adopting this principle through right to work laws, and the trend is gaining momentum.8

1

NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states/ (last visited Oct. 2,
2017).
2
Id.
3
Erin Shannon, Right-to-Work: What it is and How it Works, WASHINGTON POLICY CENTER (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/detail/right-to-work-what-it-is-and-how-it-works.
4
Id.
5
Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2014).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Shannon, supra note 3.
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The problem that arises from the implementation of “right to work” laws is that it puts
unions in a financial bind. This financial bind stems from when a union chooses to utilize their
exclusive representation option.9 When a union acts as the exclusive bargaining representation,
they must represent all workers in a labor force.10 Unions will negotiate contracts for dues paying
members, and unaffiliated employees when acting as the exclusive negotiator.11 Yet, unions only
receive compensation from the dues paying members, and the unaffiliated employees enjoy the
benefit of the negotiations while not paying for the union’s services.12 In effect, the unaffiliated
employees enjoy a “free rider” experience.13
Currently, the courts are diverging on whether this free rider experience amounts to an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause.14 One view, supported by
the 7th Circuit, holds that unions are compensated through their exclusive bargaining power.15
The opposition, which originates from Judge Wood’s dissent in Sweeney, argues that nonmembers must pay for union services.16 Judge Wood asserts that if non-members are not
required to pay for these services, then a free-rider system will persist.17 Such a free rider system
is a Takings Clause issue, because unions will not receive just compensation for their expensive
services.18 This view is receiving growing support from various trial courts in the country.19

Mark D. Meredith, From Dancing Halls to Hiring Halls: Actor’s Equity and the Closed Shop Dilemma, 96 Colum.
L. Rev. 178, 190 (1996).
10
Meredith, supra note 10.
11
Meredith, supra note 10.
12
Shannon, supra note 3.
13
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 683 (Wood, Dissenting).
14
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 671; Int'l Ass'n v. Wis., 2016 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016).
15
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.
16
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 683, 684 (Wood, Dissenting).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Int’l Ass’n, 2016 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 1.
9
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This Note argues that the views expressed in Judge Wood’s dissent and various state trial
courts is correct, and that “right to work” laws constitute an unjust taking under the Fifth
Amendment Taking Clause. This note will first delve into the statutory framework supporting
“right to work” laws. Next, this note will layout the various duties that accompany a union’s duty
of exclusive representation, and its implications on public and private employees. After laying
this foundation, this note will comment on the “right to work” laws interaction with the various
employer-employee relationship constructions. Next, this note will explore the present opposing
views in the circuits. while also examining the various property interests associated with the
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, this note will argue that unions have a valid
interest in monetary compensation for their services. The right to work laws denial of union fees
will promulgate a free rider system, and thus a Takings Clause violation.
II.

Background
Traditionally, union security agreements took one of three forms.20 These agreements are

a closed shop, union shop, and an agency shop.21 Essentially, these three structures detail various
ways in which employment relates to union membership.22 In a closed shop, an employer can
only hire workers who “were members of the union representing the employer’s employees.”23 If
the prospective employee resists joining the relevant union, then they are prohibited from
employment.24 However, in a union shop agreement, non-union members may be hired, but
continued employment is conditioned that all employees become union members within a

20

Meredith, supra note 10, at 186.
Id.
22
Ariana Levinson, Federal Preemption of Local Right-to-Work Laws, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS, 457, 463 (2017).
23
Meredith, supra note 10, at 186.
24
Id.
21
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specified time frame.25 Lastly, agency shop agreements stipulate that non-union members may be
hired, and are never required to join a union.26 Instead, workers in an agency shop must pay their
fair share of union fees that stem from collective bargaining costs.27
The United States shifted from these traditional union security agreements by banning
both closed shop and union shop agreements.28 First, the NLRA prohibited closed shop
agreements, and limited the scope of union-shop agreements.29 Eventually, the NLRA declared
union shops illegal under Section 8(a)(3), because of concerns associated with employees paying
full dues, which would be used to finance a union’s political activities.30 Thus, the only
permissible union security agreement is the agency shop.31
Moreover, the NLRA was created as means to govern the collective bargaining process
between unions and employers.32 The federal government hoped to encourage collective
bargaining, thereby aiding the free-flow of commerce.33 The Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947
strengthened NLRA Section 8(a) by prohibiting employers from influencing union
membership.34 Here, the Amendments are reinforcing an employee’s rights under Section 7 of
the NLRA to “self-organize or bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.”35

25

Id.
Andrew Buttaro, Stalemate at the Supreme Court: Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, Public Unions,
and Free Speech, 20 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 341, 343 (2006).
27
Id.
28
Levinson, supra note 21, at 463; 29 U.S.C. §8(a)(3) (1947).
29
Communications Workers of Am. V Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 772-774 (1988); 29 U.S.C. §8(a)(3) (1947).
30
Levinson, supra note 21, at 463; 29 U.S.C. §8(a)(3) (1947).
31
Id.
32
Holly R. Winefsky, Julie A. Tenney, Preserving the Garment Industry Proviso: Protecting Acceptable Working
Conditions Within the Apparel and Accessories Industries, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 587, 592 (2002); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (1935).
33
Winefsky, supra note 28.
34
29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(3) (1947).
35
29 U.S.C. § 7 (1947).
26
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Furthermore, strict union shop agreements are also prohibited due to the Supreme Court’s
decision in General Motors.36 Union shop agreements that contained a thirty-day grace period
still existed after the prohibition of closed shop agreements. But, in 1963, the Supreme Court in
General Motors held that this thirty-day grace period was improper under the recent amendments
to the NLRA.37 Essentially, the Supreme Court held that even in a union-shop agreement, a
worker cannot be fired solely on their non-membership status.38 Thus, the Supreme Court limited
the term “membership” in Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA to its “financial core,” which
encompasses solely the obligation to pay dues and fees.39
In a later decision, the Supreme Court whittled down on this “financial core”
interpretation of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.40 Seeking to shift away from the political
influence of unions, the Supreme Court limited agency fees to costs associated solely with the
unions representational and collective-bargaining activities. Here, the “financial core”
interpretation of General Motors is now further limited to only include a unions costs associated
with representational activities.41
The result of the Beck limitation is the existence of agency shop agreements in modern
labor law. Agency shop agreements abide by the Supreme Court’s limitations, and only warrant
payment for a union’s representational activities.42 But, subsequent provisions of the NLRA
provide alternate routes for state to limit the agency shop agreement permitted by Section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA.43

36

NLRA v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 742.
40
Beck, 487 U.S. at 740.
41
Id.
42
Meredith, supra note 10.
43
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 659.
37
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Section 14 of the NLRA allows states to limit union security agreements.44 Specifically,
the wording of Section 14(a) permits states to pass legislation regarding collective bargaining.45
Section 14(a) states: “for the purpose of any law, either national or local.”46 This language is
interpreted to mean that Congress expressly allows local ordinances to legislate collective
bargaining.47 Moreover, Section 14(b) of the NLRA protects states rights, and reads as
following:
“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”48
Courts interpret Section 14(b) of the NLRA as protecting a state’s ability to enact
legislation that forbids union-security agreements which are allowed under Section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA.49 This interpretation of Section 14(b) gives states the choice to prohibit agency shop
agreements.50 Many states are choosing to utilize this power by enacting “right to work” laws.
Additionally, this “financial core” interpretation is driven by a First Amendment concern,
which stems from forcing non-union public employees to financially contribute to unions.51
Forcing public employees to join unions triggers a potential violation of the First Amendment
rights of speech and association.52 This potential violation resides in the unions position in
collective bargaining activities, which can have drastic civic and political consequences. 53

44

29 U.S.C. §14 (1947).
Id.
46
29 U.S.C. §14(a) (1947).
47
Levinson, supra note 21 at 476.
48
29 U.S.C. §14(b) (1947).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 669.
52
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012).
53
Id.
45
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Requiring an individual to financially support a union whose actions are politically adverse to
their views impinges upon that person’s First Amendment rights.54
After recognizing this First Amendment right, Abood held that these public employees
are still required to pay fees associated with a union’s representational costs.55 The court held
that service charges relating to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment are subject to an agency fee.56 Thus, agency shop agreements remain permissible for
public employees, so long as the fees are related to representational services.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court later limited Abood, and drew a distinction between
public and private employees.57 In Harris, the Supreme Court held that this First Amendment
right does not apply to private employees.58 Private employees do not possess the First
Amendment rights that protect them from compulsory association and speech.59 Thus, private
employees are subject to union shop agreements, where they may have to financially contribute
to union activities that extend beyond their representational function.60
Furthermore, the Supreme Court posits that a single representative prevents prospective
confusion that would stem from the attempted enforcement of two or more agreements which
stipulate conditions of employment.61 A single bargaining unit allows an employer to bargain
with one entity, which provides an easier path to reach an agreement.62 This sentiment is further
expressed in federal law.63

54

Id.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 US 209, 226 (1977).
56
Id.
57
Harris v. Quinn, 134 U.S. 2618, 2638 (2014).
58
Id. at 2644.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 221.
62
Id.
63 29 U.S.C.S. §159(a) (2017).
55
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Federal law implies that unions are better served to represent labor related actions.64 This
implication stems from the laborers ability to vote unions as their exclusive representation.65 This
federal grant essentially functions as a monopoly for unions, where a union is the only entity that
can collectively bargain for all employees in a workforce.66 Involved in this federal grant is the
union’s obligation to satisfy the duty of fair representation.67 The duty of fair representation
forces unions to adequately serve the interests of all members in a workforce, regardless of their
affiliation with a union.68 In other words, the duty of fair representation requires the union to
represent both paying members and nonmembers.69
Although a union is still able to conduct members-only representation, chances are that
unions will be designated as the exclusive-representation for laborers.70 In right to work states,
non-union members will be grouped into this representation, and will not be forced to pay for
union services.71 This presents a potential free-rider problem, where potential employees are
incentivized to not contribute to a union.72 The duties of fair representation and federal duty of
exclusive representation allows these non-members to reap the benefits regardless of their choice
to pay into the union.73
Criticisms are emerging about this free-rider problem, specifically whether it triggers the
Takings Clause.74 In the 7th Circuit, Judge Wood’s dissent in Sweeney argued that the union’s

64

29 U.S.C.S. §159(a) (2017).
Id.
66
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.
67
Id. at 671 (Wood, dissenting).
68
Id.; Abood, 431 US at 221.
69
Id.
70
29 U.S.C.S. §159(a) (2017).
71
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.
72
Id at 673.
73
Id.
74
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 672 (Wood, dissenting).
65
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uncompensated services amount to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause.75 Judge Wood asserts that unions suffer an unjust taking of property when
forced to provide free services to non-members.76
Judge Wood argues that the right to work laws exempt non-union employees from
reimbursing unions for their services.77 Here, Judge Wood references Beck, and claims that
federal law entitles unions to fees stemming from their representational duties.78 Judge Wood
refutes the notion that paying representational services will cause nonmember to morph into
members.79 Rather, union membership should be distinguished by the payments of initiation fees
and monthly dues.80
Moreover, Judge Wood argues that the majority creates a “free rider” problem by holding
that the unions are justly compensated through their grant of exclusive representation.81 This
“free rider” problem incentivizes employees to decline union membership, because they can reap
the benefits of union services upon the commencement of a collective action.82 This “free-rider”
implicates the Takings Clause, because right to work laws mandate unions to provide property to
another private party.83 Judge Wood asserts that the Takings Clause is violated from this forced
transfer of property without compensation.84

75

Id.
Id at 671 (Wood, dissenting).
77
Id at 674.
78
Id at 676.
76

79
80
81
82

83
84

Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 678.
Id at 674.
Id at 670.
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 673 (Wood, dissenting).

Id. at 674.
Id.
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In making the Takings Clause argument, Judge Wood references the different services
unions provide.85 These services include filing grievances, investigations, arbitrations, and other
duties.86 The costs of these services can easily be thousands of dollars.87 These uncompensated
services force Judge Wood to focus on the seizure of money as a protected property interest
when forming her Takings Clause analysis.88 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation and
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington support Judge Wood’s argument that money is a
recognized property interest under the Takings Clause.89
In Phillips, the court states that the interest accrued by funds in a lawyer-managed trust
(IOLTA) accounts is the private property of the client.90 Furthermore, in Brown the court held
that funds transferred from IOLTA accounts to a legal foundation qualifies as an action for a
“public use” under the Takings Clause.91 Brown stated that the Takings Clause was violated if
the clients were entitled to compensation.92 Compensation is measured by an individual’s
pecuniary loss, not the recipient’s gain.93 Additionally, the public use prong is satisfied if a
compelling public interest is served.94 In Brown, the petitioners suffered no net loss, and served
the public interest by providing legal services to the needy.95 Taken together, the Supreme Court
viewed that money was used for a public use, and implicitly acknowledged that money us a

85

Id at 675.
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 671.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538
U.S. 216 (2003).
90
Id.
91
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003).
92
Id. at 240.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 232.
95
Id. at 240.
86
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protected property interest. Also, these holdings collectively imply that money may be a
protected property interest if an individual suffers a net loss.96
Judge Wood’s dissent builds off the above-mentioned case law, and states that Indiana is
forcing unions to donate their expensive services to nonmembers.97 In doing so, the dissent
references Beck, which implied that nonmembers should pay for the benefits they receive from
union representation.98 Judge Wood interprets Beck to mean that non-members can be compelled
to pay for union services that they consume.99
The popularity of Judge Wood’s dissent is evidenced by various state trial courts
choosing to implement her argument rather than the Sweeney majority. The 14th Circuit of
Wisconsin is one of the few courts to have followed Judge Wood’s reasoning in Sweeney.100
Here, Wisconsin was dealing with a newly implemented right to work law.101 This state trial
court followed Judge Wood’s reasoning to a tee, and even quotes from her dissent at length to
arrive at their conclusion.102 The 14th Circuit of Wisconsin accepted the union’s claim that they
have a legally protected property interest in services performed for both member and nonmembers.103 This private property interest exists because unions must use funds from their
treasury to promulgate these services.104
Furthermore, the 14th Circuit of Wisconsin holds that the taking of union’s funds
qualifies as a “public use” under the Takings Clause.105 Wisconsin legislators explained the

96

Brown, 538 U.S. at 240.
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 674 (Wood, dissenting).
98
Beck, 487 U.S. at 735.
99
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 675 (Wood, dissenting).
100
Int'l Ass'n v. Wis., 2016 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016)
101
Id. at 3.
102
Id. at 14, 15.
103
Id. at 10.
104
Id.
105
Int’l Ass’n, 2016 Cir. LEXIS at 13.
97
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purpose behind their newly enacted law to “make the business climate in the State more
favorable by eliminating the power of labor organizations.”106 This purpose applies to all right to
work laws, because their focus is to weaken the power unions have over business and labor.
Under Takings Clause scrutiny, any private property seized by the government for a public use
must be met with just compensation.107 Here, the 14th Circuit of Wisconsin echoes Judge Wood
and holds that a public use exists, even though the property (services) is transferring from one
private party to another.108 The court states that there is no principle where private property may
be seized from one individual, and given to another for their private use and enjoyment.109
The 14th Circuit of Wisconsin also accepts that a “free rider” problem exists and will
persist if unions remain uncompensated for their services to nonmembers.110 The 14th Circuit
essentially adopts Judge Wood’s argument verbatim.111 Wisconsin’s state trial court is the first to
hold that a right to work law operates as an unconstitutional taking. Yet, preceding opinions have
held that the proper set of facts could demonstrate how a union would suffer a deprivation of
compensation for services provided.112 In Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2014),
Justice Rucker’s concurring opinion intimated that it is possible for unions to succeed on an
unjust taking claim.113 Justice Rucker explained that mandating unions to bear the cost of
representing all employees presented the foundation of a Takings Claim.114

106

Id.
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 674 (Wood, dissenting).
108
Int'l Ass'n v. Wis., 2016 Cir. LEXIS at 13.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 15.
111
Id.
112
Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2014).
113
Id.
114
Id.
107
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The 14th Circuit of Wisconsin’s holding was stayed at the court of appeals; yet, it still
has the effect of validating the arguments posed by Judge Wood and Justice Rucker.115 The
validation of Judge Wood’s argument is evidenced by the further acceptance of her reasoning in
additional jurisdictions.116 In W.Va. AFL-CIO v. Tomblin, the West Virginia State Trial Court
sided with the unions, and awarded a preliminary injunction to block the states right to work
law.117 The majority referenced Judge Wood’s “free-rider” argument, where allowing nonpaying laborers to reap the benefits of union services presents an unconstitutional taking.118 The
court chose to recognize the serious constitutional harms to unions, and stated that these harms
were serious enough to delay the implementation of West Virginia’s right to work law.119
Although, Judge Wood’s argument has been met with growing acceptance, the opposition
dominates. The majority in Sweeney that the unions were compensated for their services to
nonmembers.120 Here, the union chose not to advance a Takings Clause argument.121 Yet, the
majority reasoned that even if the union chose to advance the Takings Clause argument, they
would face the challenge of proving how repealing Indiana’s right to work laws would provide
an adequate remedy.122 It is federal law that enforces the duty of fair representation, and
Indiana’s right to work laws only precludes unions from collecting fees in the performance of

William Welkowitz, Unions Using “Takings” Clause Arguments to Challenge Right-to-Work Laws, LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT BLOG, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.bna.com/unions-using-takingsb73014448852/.
116
W. Va. AFL-CIO v. Tomblin, 2017 W.V. Cir. LEXIS 2 (2017).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 17.
119
Id.
120
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.
121
Id. at 664.
122
Id. at 666.
115
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that federal duty.123 Thus, the court implied that the federal duty may need to reexamined, rather
than repealing Indiana’s right to work law.124
Moreover, the majority refuted the idea that unions have a protectable property interest in
securing fees for services provided for non-members.125 The majority concluded that a union is
justly compensated through “federal law’s grant to the union the right to exclusively bargain with
an employer.”126 Here, the 7th Circuit states that a union’s right as the exclusive negotiator is just
compensation for their provision of services to non-members.
Additionally, the Northern District of Idaho sided with the majority in Sweeney, and
rejected Judge Wood’s reasoning that right to work laws operate as an unconstitutional taking at
the union’s expense.127 The court focused on the duty of fair representation proscribed by federal
law.128 The duty of fair representation precluded the union’s claim that they suffer an unjust
taking of property.129 The court held that the duty of fair representation only restricts the union
from collecting fees that are meant to cover the expenses associated with the performance of
their duty.130 The court also states that unions are justly compensated by their right to bargain
exclusively with the employer.131
The West Virginia Supreme Court also refutes the notion that unions suffer an
unconstitutional taking of property by being prohibited from collecting fees from
nonmembers.132 In Morrisey v. West Virginia, the court held that without a collective bargaining

123

Id.
Id.
125
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.
126
Id.
127
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 370 v. Wasden, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1223 (D. Idaho, 2016).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO, 2017 WL 410375 (W. Va. 2017).
124
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agreement, a union only has a “unilateral expectation of fees.”133 West Virginia defines a
“property interest” as a right that must derive from either a private contract or a state law.134
Furthermore, a protected property interest must be something more than a unilateral
expectation.135 Thus, without a collective bargaining agreement, unions only have a unilateral
expectation of fees from nonmembers.136 Lastly, the court asserts that no other appellate court
has examined a Takings Clause challenge to a right to work law and accepted the union’s
argument.137
Various law review articles touch on periphery issues regarding this question. Michael
Hostetler explains that a bare desire for compensation does not amount to a recognized property
interest.138 Yet, in a footnote, Hostetler states that the Supreme Court has not out rightly
determined whether personal services constitute property under the Takings Clause.139
Regardless, Hostetler looks to the interpretations of various lower courts, who hold that the
“time, experience, and skill of a professional” amount to a protectable property interest.140
Also, Howard Master examines the issue of whether labor is protected under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.141 Master argues that the labor expended by the wrongfully
convicted should be judged under the Takings Clause.142 Furthermore, Master asserts that the

133

Id.
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Morrisey, 2017 WL 410375.
138
Michael J. Hostetler, Intangible Property under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute and the Takings Clause: A Case
Study, 50 Duke L.J. 589 (2000).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Howard S. Master, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 60
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 97 (2004).
142
Id. at 123.
134
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exclusion of labor from the Takings Clause’s scrutiny is “manifestly reasonable.”143 He goes on
to say that labor has long been regarded as a protected property right.144
It is a long-standing principle that one’s labor constitutes a protected property interest,
which deserves compensation.145 Yet, in right to work states, a distinction is made about the
collection of union fees for representing nonmembers. The 7th Circuit asserts that it’s the union’s
federal duty of fair representation which precludes them from receiving compensation.146 Courts
have previously held that certain professions are not entitled to fees.147 The court held in United
States v. Dillon that pro bono attorney services were not recognized under the Takings Clause.148
The court reasoned that attorney’s fees are different from other professions, because attorney’s
have a “civic duty” to represent indigents.149 Attorney’s, unlike other professions, have an
ancient tradition of representing the impoverished when performing services as officers of the
court.150 Thus, this civic duty rule operates as an exception to the general proposition that labor
constitutes a protectable property interest.151
Hostetler examines the civic duty rule and expands its scope to include activities on one’s
property that depart from “existing rule or understandings.”152 A breach of one of these rules or
understandings could be a usage of property that constitutes a nuisance, or where tradition states
that the particular property use does not require compensation.153 Hostetler then asserts that

143

Id.
Id.
145
Id.; Hostetler, supra note 74; DeLisio v. Alaska Super. Ct., 740 P.2d 437, 440 (Alaska 1987) (quoting Coffeyville
Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 76 P. 848, 850 (Kan. 1904))
146
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.
147
United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1965).
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 635.
151
Id.
152
Hostetler, supra note 74 at 128.
153
Id.
144
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outside of civic duty implications, labor is a protected property interest where an individual is
free to sell it for compensation.154The 7th Circuit, nor any Right to Work state has yet to justify
their prohibition on unions receiving compensation through a civic duty analysis. Instead, these
courts rely on the federal duties of fair representation and exclusive representation when
mandating that unions must provide nonmembers free services.
III.

Analysis
Judge Wood rightfully asserts that “right to work” laws violate the Takings Clause of the

Fifth Amendment.155 The heart of Judge Wood’s argument is that unions should receive
monetary compensation for their representational services. Agency shops embody this type of
fee system, which are permissible under the NLRA.156 Although agency shops are permissible,
states have the option to prohibit such a system under Section 8(a)(3) and Section 14(b) of the
NLRA.157 States are increasingly utilizing this power by implementing “right to work” laws.158
Yet, Judge Wood’s contention arrives out of an externality of the right to work laws. This
externality arises out of unions being forced to provide their services for free when operating as
an exclusive representative.159 These representative services are expensive, easily costing
thousands of dollars.160 Forcing the unions to swallow these immense financial costs triggers
Takings Clause scrutiny, because the Supreme Court recognizes money as a protectable property
interest.161

154

Id. at 123.
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at PN (Wood, dissenting).
156
Beck, 487 U.S. at 740.
157 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 659.
158
Shannon, supra note 3.
159
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 672.
160
Id.
161 see e.g. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 156; see also Brown, 538 U.S. at 235.
155
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The IOLTA cases expressed in the Sweeney dissent provide strong support that money is
a property interest under the Takings Clause.162 The Supreme Court in Phillips states that interest
income generated in a lawyer’s IOLTA account is viewed as private property of a client, and
thus protected by the Takings Clause.163 The court refuted the government’s argument that
private property was not implicated.164 Here, the court approached the property issue by
searching for the creator of the value.165 The Supreme Court concluded that the interest was
created from the client’s funds, rather than any government efforts.166
Unlike the IOLTA accounts, the unions funds at stake here do not face the question of
value origin. Furthermore, Phillips’ analysis assigned value to the funds, and would only deny
Takings Clause protection if it was the government who created the value.167 Here, the value of
the union funds is generated from their valuable representational services. The application of
Phillips analysis to right to work states makes clear that the monetary expenses incurred by
unions qualify as a protected property interest.
Moreover, Brown builds off the value of interest generated by IOLTA accounts, and
takes it a step further by examining the Takings Clause issue.168 The Supreme Court held that
transferring the monetary interest to a different owner is a per se taking, so long as it is for a legit
public use.169 The right to work laws operate as a forced transfer of union funds from the union
to nonmembers. Here, the duty of exclusive representation forces unions to expend their own
resources when representing nonmembers. The duty of exclusive representation operates as a
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forced transfer under Brown, because it forces the transfer of funds from one owner to another.170
Furthermore, the duty of fair representation requires unions to give the same quality of services
to nonmembers.171 The result is that nonmembers are receiving the same expensive services
enjoyed by paying members.172 The original owner (unions) are forced to convert those funds
into services, which are meant to benefit nonmembers. This practice operates as a transfer, and
Brown articulated that a practice of this sort is subject to Takings Clause scrutiny,173 which
requires payment to satisfy just compensation.174
Brown also explains that compensation is measured by an owner’s pecuniary loss, rather
than the benefiting party’s gain.175 Unlike Brown, where there was no pecuniary loss to the
clients, here, there is a clear harm to unions.176 The mandated services to nonmembers can cost
unions thousands of dollars.177 This blatant pecuniary loss to unions deserves to be met with
adequate compensation from nonmembers.
Both Brown and Phillips focus on the transfer of money as a private property interest,
which is subject to Takings Clause scrutiny.178 Here, the unions provision of services is subject
to Taking Clause scrutiny, because it involves the seizure money from a private party (unions),
and transfers it to another private party (non-members), for a legitimate public use.179 The
Supreme Court must step in, and classify the expenses associated with union services to
nonmembers as an involuntary transfer of funds, thus subject to Takings Clause Scrutiny.
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Brown also measures a “public use” by determining if there is a compelling public
interest involved.180 Diverting the interest from the IOLTA funds to accounts used for providing
legal services to the impoverished qualified as compelling public interest.181 Here, there is no
justifiable public interest in providing free services to employees who decide against union
membership. There is no implication that nonmembers are suffer a financial disadvantage when
compared to union members. Furthermore, the interest of having employees represented in one
collective action would still be met if an agency fee is imposed on nonmembers.182 An agency
fee would only require a nonmember to pay a union when they reap the benefits of union
services.183 Thus, agency fees would still allow employees to retain their nonmember status.
Additionally, unions are not subject to special duties that may exist in other professions.
In Dillon, the court held that attorney’s fees were not subject to Takings Clause scrutiny because
lawyers have a “civic duty” to represent indigents.184 The “civic duty” of an attorney stems from
the ancient and established tradition of the profession to represent those who are in need.185
Unlike Dillon, the unions effected by right to work laws have no civic duty to provide
services to nonmembers. The only potential “civic duty” assigned to unions is attached to the
federal mandates of fair and exclusive representation. Judge Wood explains that accompanied
with the right of fair representation is the duty to “serve the interests of all members of the
bargaining unit without hostility or discrimination, and to exercise its discretion with complete
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good faith and honesty.”186 This is the only “civic duty” proscribed to unions. There is no
mandate that unions execute this duty free of charge.
Yet, unions are implicitly coerced to represent all employees in an organization when
undertaking representational duties. Unions have the option at the beginning of an action to
represent only dues paying employees.187 This option fades away if the majority of laborers vote
to have the union serve as their sole representative.188 Such a majority vote implicates the duty of
exclusive representation.189 Thus, this federal mandate of exclusive representation essentially
operates as a forced civic duty on unions to represent all employees in an entity.
Exclusive representation is a fundamental value in labor law, which can be viewed as a
direct benefit to unions. Unions do not have to worry about competing with other representatives
when operating as the exclusive negotiator.190 Unions essentially have a monopoly on contract
negotiation/collective bargaining when operating as the exclusive negotiator.191 But, the benefit
of exclusive representation comes into question when dealing with right to work laws. The
advantage of exclusive representation backfires on unions, because they are forced to represent
nonmembers without receiving payment.
The reasoning behind this federal mandate can be best attributed to the government’s
interest in convenience. Forcing the unions to represent all employees when the majority of
workers deem it appropriate allows their collective voice to be met with one representative.192
Removing competition between representatives from this dynamic increases the expedience of
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collective labor actions, while also allowing employees to retrieve equal treatment. Without
exclusive representation, only members would be represented by unions, while nonmembers
would have to enter the open market and find individual representation.193 Such a practice would
lead members and nonmembers being governed by different labor agreements. This result would
cause harm in labor relations; thus, exclusive representation exists partly to curb such a harmful
practice.
Additionally, the Supreme Court already held that employees who are nonmembers can
be compelled to compensate unions for their services.194 In Beck and Abood, the Supreme Court
established a distinction between the services nonmembers should be responsible for, and fees in
which they should retain an exemption.195 In their analysis of NLRA §8(a)(3), Beck and Abood
held that nonmembers should be responsible for fees that are related to collective bargaining.196
This holding reconciles the competing interests between unions who desire compensation, and
nonmembers who wish to separate themselves from the political affiliations of a union.197 Unions
would be compensated for costs associated with contract administration and collective
bargaining, and would not receive compensation for unrelated activities.198 A straightforward
application of Beck and Abood resolves the Takings Clause issue associated with right to work
laws. Yet, the majority in Sweeney tweaked their application of this Supreme Court precedent.199
The majority in Sweeney narrowly followed the Supreme Court, and construed the word
“member” of NLRA §8(a)(3) and boiled the word down to “its financial core.”200 The majority
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construed the financial core language to only amount to representation fees.201 After
implementing NLRA §14(b)’s allowance of state laws that prohibit membership, the majority
concluded that states can prohibit agreements that force employees to pay representation fees. 202
Judge Wood rejects this interpretation in her dissent, and argues that membership should be
limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues.203 The dissent argues that
nonmembers and members should be distinguished on these two payments.204 Furthermore, the
dissent argues that nonmembers should be forced to pay dues when reaping the benefits from
collective bargaining and contract administration.205
In right to work states, a prospective employee’s decision to join a union, along with their
payment of an initiation fee and monthly dues, should qualify them as a union member. Their
continued membership should be solely reliant on their continued payment of these dues. Thus,
when interpreting NLRA §14(b), the term “members” should be defined by one’s adherence to
their dues payments. If one fails to meet their dues obligations, they will be classified as a
nonmember. This nonmember status will then bring in the holding from Beck, which mandates
that nonmembers pay representation fees associated with collective bargaining and contract
administration.206
Maintaining a bright line distinction between a “member” and “nonmember” is key to
providing a fair environment to both employees and unions. Judge Wood criticizes the Sweeney
majority for blurring the line between these two statuses.207 Her criticism is aimed at the
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majority’s criterion for when a nonmember transforms into a member.208 The Sweeney majority
essentially reclassifies a nonmember as a member if they are forced to pay any reimbursement
for representation.209 By broadly interpreting the word “member” in §14(b), the Sweeney
majority expands the scope of right to work laws, and directly harms the unions. A more rigid
approach in construing “member” in NLRA §14(b) would prevent the unions preemption from
collecting representation related fees from nonmembers.
If the Supreme Court adopts such an interpretation, then unions could immediately
collect representational fees. As previously explained, unions and employees do not share any
special relationship that is rooted in history or tradition. Although unions are not needed to
prevent sweat shops, their protective services are still needed to ensure that workers receive
necessary benefits. Today, employers are trying to cut costs by reducing medical coverage and
reducing jobs.210 Unions are needed to collectively represent employees who are threatened by
these corporate initiatives, and unions need funds to furnish their services.
Yet, most courts invalidate the unions claim to these fees. The Supreme Court in West
Virginia recently held that unions only have a unilateral expectation of fees from nonmembers.211
The court focuses on the claimed property interest of unions, and states that a protected property
interest must originate from a contract or state law.212 In Morrisey, the Supreme Court in West
Virginia raised this “unilateral expectation of fees” argument to refute the unions claim that they
suffered an unjust taking.213 The Morrisey majority improperly focuses on the agreement
between the unions and employees when rejecting the unions claim to fees. Instead, the court
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should examine the unions merits in demanding fees, and the costly consequences of rejecting
their claim.
In examining the unions merits to these fees, the court should circle back to the IOLTA
trust fund cases.214 The IOLTA trust fund cases implied that an uncompensated involuntary
transfer of funds qualifies as an unjust taking. The more proper analysis is to focus exclusively
on the union’s losses when forced to represent nonmembers. Under this framework, Morrisey’s
expectation analysis is discarded, and the core issue of the union’s monetary loss is highlighted.
The union’s forced services, which result in costly monetary loss, fit perfectly under the
framework explained in Brown.215 Thus, Morrisey’s expectation analysis circumvents the Brown
analysis which focuses on monetary loss. The Supreme Court would be wise to discard the
expectation analysis employed by Morrisey, and utilize Brown to analyze the direct harm
incurred by unions.
Furthermore, lower courts generally consider the time, experience, and skill of a
professional to be a protected property interest.216 The Supreme Court has yet to hold that
personal services of a professional qualify as a protected property interest.217 A clarification by
the Supreme Court would be instrumental in determining whether a union’s services to all
employees is a property interest. If the Supreme Court holds that professional services are a valid
property interest, the lone issue would be whether the duties of fair and exclusive representation
preempt the unions from collecting fees. It is here where a straightforward application of Beck’s
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holding would fit, and proper construction of the word member in NLRA §14(b) would permit
unions to collect fees.218
Additionally, the question persists of what is adequate compensation? The Sweeney
majority argued that unions are justly compensated through their right to be the exclusive
negotiator between employer and employee relations.219 The majority reasoned that the duty of
fair representation accompanies the duty of exclusive representation, and proscribes the unions
conduct in acting as the sole negotiator.220 As mentioned before, the duty of exclusive
representation is a complex issue that conveys the extreme benefit of a monopoly to unions.
However, the benefits associated with exclusive representation must be balanced against any
burden the privilege causes the unions.
The Sweeney majority explicitly acknowledged a burden the combination of both
exclusive representation and the duty of fair representation inflict harm upon unions. Judge
Tinder explains that because federal law imposes a duty of fair representation, Indiana’s right to
work statute in question did not “take” property from the unions.221 Rather, the duty of fair
representation only precluded the union from receiving fees during their performance of the duty.
Thus, Judge Tinder posits that the federal duty of fair representation is to blame, and not
Indiana’s right to work law.222
Judge Tinder may be correct in assigning the blame to the interaction between exclusive
representation and fair representation as the culprits for the unions precarious situation.223 But,
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Judge Tinder states that unions are properly compensated through their right to be the exclusive
negotiator to avoid grappling with these federal mandates.224 Here, the majority fails to uphold
the unions protected property rights and promotes the “free-rider” system. Exclusive
representation fails to serve as adequate compensation because unions are still left without any
monetary compensation. Moreover, the Sweeney majority fails to address how the perceived
compensation through exclusive representation offsets the unions monetary loss.225 Permitting a
system where unions spend thousands of dollars in representation is unjust. The presence of
federal mandates takes the power to remedy the situation away from the state courts. Thus, the
Supreme Court must remedy the confusion, and allow the unions to receive proper remedy.
Fortunately, state courts are trending in the direction that provides a recourse for unions.
First, Judge Wood’s dissent states that the Sweeney majority enforced an unconstitutional
confiscation that is perpetuated by the American labor law system.226 Here, Judge Wood
describes how there are alternatives to the labor law system utilized by the United States, where
individuals can form members-only unions to collectively bargain.227 The duty of exclusive
representation intercedes on the viability of a members-only system.228 As explained before,
Judge Wood focuses on the majority’s construction of the word “member” in NLRA §14(b).229
Yet, Judge Wood digresses and explains that if her critique is wrong, then a constitutional
problem exists in labor law jurisprudence. Here, Judge Wood says that Congress always has the
option to change the labor law, but that is unlikely to occur.230
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Although Judge Wood directly references Congress in her dissent, she implicitly calls
upon the Supreme Court to clarify the definition of the word “member” in NLRA §14(b).231 If
the Supreme Court distinguished union members from nonmembers under §14(b) scrutiny, then
the Beck analysis could be applied in a straightforward manner. Instead, the Sweeney majority’s
“financial core” analysis of the word “membership” persists, which prevents the Beck analysis
from having an impact.232
Judge Wood’s dissent is met with growing popularity, as a Wisconsin State court adopted
her reasoning verbatim when addressing a local right to work statute.233 The 14th Circuit of
Wisconsin sought to tackle the free-rider issue.234 The court adopted Judge Wood’s critiques of
the exclusive representation labor law system, and her rejection that unions are adequately
compensated through exclusive representation.235 Unfortunately, this Wisconsin holding is not
controlling because it was stayed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 236 At the time of this
article, it is unclear whether this holding will be binding in the 14th Circuit of Wisconsin. Yet,
Wisconsin’s attempted incorporation of Judge Wood’s dissent validates her viewpoint, and
displays that other states seek to take a similar approach.
Additionally, this Takings Clause issue was recently highlighted in a West Virginia state
court, which recognized the unions harm in receiving no reimbursement for their services.237 The
court explained that although the state has an interest in shielding workers from forced
membership into unions, that interest does not outweigh the burden on a unions provision of free
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services to nonmembers.238 The growing popularity of Judge Wood’s argument produces a
tension among the courts in right to work states. Lower courts attempt to implement concepts
from Judge Wood’s dissent, but their efforts are stonewalled. This stonewalling is a result of the
courts upholding the exclusive representation labor law system engrained in America. Judge
Wood, along with a growing number of lower courts, recognize that unions have a legally
protectable interest in their resources, and are entitled to compensation for their expensive
services.
Supporters of Judge Wood and the various lower courts argue that the exclusive
representation system must be abolished. Catherine Fisk, a professor at UC Irvine School of
Law, and Benjamin Sachs, a law professor at Harvard, make the argument for an alternative
labor system.239 Here, the two professors echo the sentiments expressed by Judge Wood’s
dissent, and then explain how abandoning the exclusive representation system is an adequate
solution.240 Abandoning the system of exclusive representation would make it difficult for
nonmembers because they may end up with different working conditions than union members.241
Thus, the authors believe that such an extreme reform would entice nonmembers to pay unions
for their services.242
Turning away from the exclusive representation system would force nonmembers into a
bind, but it is an extreme solution that is unnecessary. Instead, redefining the term “member”
under NLRA §14(b) provides a more feasible, and just as effective remedy to the free rider
problem posed by right to work statutes. Providing a direct method for the Beck analysis to take
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control will form a clear system, where nonmembers will be on notice of situations where they
are obligated to pay unions. Additionally, unions will know when they can expect to be
compensated, and when they should only expect payment from nonmembers. To provide a
clearer system, the Supreme Court must step in and recognize the unions services to
nonmembers as a protected property interest.
IV.

Conclusion
The majority in Morrisey stated that “no other appellate court in this country has

examined a Takings challenge to a right to work law and accepted” it.243 Whether right to work
laws constitute a Takings Clause issue is a rapidly developing topic. At the time of this note, no
circuit court has adopted the principles of Judge Wood’s argument. Yet, it does appear that a
conflict is imminent with a growing number of lower courts accepting the Sweeney dissent.
If faced with this issue, the Supreme Court must draw on the reasoning expressed in
Judge Wood’s dissent, and provide unions a method to recoup funds. First, the Supreme Court
must affirmatively recognize money as a protectable property interest. The IOLTA cases imply
the compulsory seizure of money falls within a Takings Clause analysis. The Supreme Court
must validate this trend, and place money within the grasp of the Takings Clause.
Next, the Supreme Court should uphold the narrow “financial core” interpretation of the
word “membership” in NLRA §14(b). The Supreme Court would dismiss any interpretation that
the word “membership” should be construed per its “financial core.” Instead, an interpretation
that rests on whether an individual’s pay dues or not is more adequate. After providing a narrow
construction of “membership,” the Supreme Court could then apply Beck and institute a rigid set
of circumstances when nonmembers must pay fees. Beck holds that nonmembers are mandated to
243
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pay union fees when reaping the benefits of collective bargaining or contract administration.244
Thus, unions would be entitled to receive compensation when performing forced services
proscribed under the federal duties of exclusive and fair representation.
The option of removing the duty of exclusive representation would remedy the issue, but
it is an extreme solution. Instead, the Supreme Court is better served to construe the word
“member” in NLRA §14(b) that permits the Beck analysis to take hold. Ruling in this manner
will allow the principles expressed in Judge Wood’s Sweeney dissent, the 14th Circuit of
Wisconsin, and the West Virginia state court to become active law.
This free-rider experience enjoyed by non-members has been increasingly criticized by
the courts. The central argument proposed by the unions is that duty to provide services without
compensation constitutes an unjust taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.245
Thus far, courts have held that a state’s passage of right to work laws, which in turn prohibit
unions from being compensated for representing non-union members, does not equate to a
Takings Clause violation.246 Yet, a state trial court in Wisconsin held in the exact opposite of the
circuits. The Wisconsin state trial court ruled that the fees unions spend in representing nonmembers in right to work states warrants compensation.247
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